American emirates? by Yvonne Levy
October 9, 1981 
American Emirates? 
Key energy-producing states-located 
mainly in the West-were heartened by a 
recent Supreme Court decision upholding 
Montana's right to levy a stiff "severance" tax 
on coal mined there. (The name "severance 
tax" comes from the fact that it is appl ied at 
the production stage, as the product is 
"severed" from the ground.) The decision 
supports those states' efforts to use energy 
severance taxes as a major source of general 
revenue. But industries, utilities and other 
energy consumers in the energy-resource 
deficient states-mainly in the Midwest and 
Northeast -were angered by the decision. 
Producing states argue that severance taxes 
are necessary to provide for the roads, 
sewers, schools and other facilities required 
to support rapid energy development-and 
to ensure that some revenues are left in state 
coffers followi  ng the depletion of  thei r energy 
resources. But opponents argue that the tax 
drains income from energy-poor to energy-
rich states, and thereby precipitates one of  the 
largest capital transfers in the nation's history. 
Indeed, they envision the creation of a de 
facto "United American Emirates" -a  group 
of energy-producing states whose control 
over domestic energy sources leads to a 
major transfer of wealth. Also, they maintain 
that, because of  the increased revenue from 
this source, energy-producing states can 
reduce other business taxes and thereby 
encourage business to locate there, 
facilitating further transfers of wealth. These 
states, moreover, can qualify for additional 
Federal payments on revenue sharing and 
other programs, because the allocation 
formulas sometimes reward states for their 
"tax effort," the amount of revenue they raise 
on their own. 
The arguments against the tax bear closer 
scrutiny. There is no question that severance 
taxes constitute an important and growing 
source of state revenue for the resource-rich 
states, particularly now that domestic oil 
prices have been decontrolled. It is also true 
that severance-tax revenues are making it 
possible for state governments to reduce 
other taxes below levels that might otherwise 
prevail. But the argument that such taxes are 
being passed on to out-of-state customers 
through higher energy prices undoubtedly 
holds true only for certain energy sources. 
Most of  the pass-through apparently pertains 
to coal and uranium, which account for less 
than one-tenth of  the total state revenues 
derived from energy severance taxes. 
Montana decision 
Since 1921, Montana has imposed a 
severance tax on the output of its coal mines, 
including coal mined on Federal lands. In 
1975, however, the state legislature voted to 
raise the tax for surface-mined coal to a range 
of  20 to 30 percent of  the contract sa les pri  ce, 
with the maximum applying to coal with the 
highest heat content. In 1978, four Montana 
coal producers and eleven of their out-of-
state electric-utility customers sought tax 
refunds on constitutional grounds. The trial 
court-and later the Montana Supreme Court 
-upheld the tax, and the utilities then 
appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
The uti I  ities contended that the Montana tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce, 
because 90 percent of Montana coal is 
shipped to other states under contracts that 
shift the burden primarily to non-Montana 
utility companies and thus to residents of 
other states. Those contracts typically provide 
for a pass-through of state-taxation costs to 
the utilities, while fuel-adjustment clauses in 
turn provide for a further pass-through of  such 
costs to utility customers. The utilities argued 
furtherthatthetax is excessive, being unfairly 
related to the value of  the mine-related 
services the state provides or the mine-related 
costs it incurs. Finally, they argued thatthe tax 
violates Federal law-namely the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act of 1920-because it 
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reduces the Government's royalty payments 
from output from Federally-owned land. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a state 
severance tax is subject to Constitutional 
review even though imposed on goods prior 
to their entrance into the stream of interstate 
commerce. The Court added, however, that 
the Montana tax is even-handed and 
nondiscriminatory with regard to out-of-state 
users, because it is computed at the same rate 
regardless of  the coal's final destination. The 
Court ruled further that the question of what 
constitutes an "excessive" rate is a matter for 
Congress and not the courts to resolve. 
Finally, it ruled that the tax does not violate 
the purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act, which expressly authorized the states to 
levy and collect taxes as though the Federal 
government were not concerned. 
Rising revenues 
Only a few states are net exporters of  primary 
energy: Louisiana, Wyoming, New Mexico, 
Kentucky, Alaska, Oklahoma, West Virginia, 
Montana and Texas (1976 data). The major 
oil-and-gas producing states are Texas, 
Alaska, Louisiana, California and Oklahoma. 
Coal resources are more widely dispersed, 
with the largest producers being Kentucky, 
West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. 
(Montana actually is one of  the smaller 
producers, with about 4 percent of the total.) 
New Mexico and Wyoming produce most of 
the nation's uranium. 
Many producing states now impose 
severance taxes. The Alaska legislature 
recently raised that state's petroleum-
severance tax from 12.25 percent to 15.0 
percent, making it the highest in the nation. 
Louisiana charges 12.5 percent, while other 
states charge rates ranging from 7.0 percent 
to 1.5 percent. In the case of coal, Wyoming 
charges the second highest rate after 
Montana-namely 10.5 percent-while 
other states' rates range from 8.4 percent to as 
little as 0.2 percent. 
Tax revenues from this source have grown 
substantially, from $840 million in 1973 to 
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$3.7 billion in 1980-largely reflecting the 
upsurge in domestic energy prices duringthis 
period. Coal revenues showed the most rapid 
growth, rising from $38 million to $329 
million over the period, but still comprised 
only 9 percent of the total by 1980. Oil-and-
gas severance tax revenues-the bulk of  the 
total-rose from $808 million to $3.4 billion. 
As a result of this growth, energy severance 
taxes rose in importance as a source of state 
revenue-in 1980, accounting for over one-
third of Alaska's total revenues and over one-
fourth of Oklahoma's and Wyoming's totals. 
The growth in severance-tax revenues oc-
curred in the face of  price controls on domes-
tically-produced oil and gas. But revenues 
may now soar, in the wake of (full or partial) 
decontrol of these prices. Moreover, rents 
and royalties on state-owned oil and gas 
properties add even more to the total. Ac-
cording to Treasury Department estimates, 
oil-producing states could collect $128 bil-
lion during this decade simply as a result of 
decontrol. More than $100 billion of  that 
total would flow to just four states: Alaska, 
California, Louisiana and Texas. (That ac-
counts for Alaska's abilityto repeal its income 
tax and to refund 1979 and 1980 taxes.) 
Phased decontrol of natural-gas prices under 
present law would yield producing states 
another $50 billion, 'with immediate decon-
trol yielding revenues many times greater. 
Who really pays? 
Energy resource-deficient states argue that 
these taxes are shifted forward fully to 
consumers; and that, since most of the 
production is sold in interstate markets, most 
of the tax is "exported". Butthat argument 
neglects the fact that the structure of the 
markets for most energy sources will not 
permit a full pass-through of severance taxes 
to consumers, even when the regulatory 
framework is not an impediment. 
Indeed, producers' ability to pass on a 
production tax depends largely upon the 
elasticity of demand for the product in 
question. The moreunresponsive the 
quantity demanded is to a given change in price-i.e., the more inelastic th~ demand 
schedule-the greater is the ability to pass on 
the tax to consumers through a higher price. 
In the case of  domestically-produced crude 
oil  in an unregulated environment, imports 
constitute a near-perfect substitute, and the 
demand for domestic oil approaches infinity 
-i.e., is perfectly elastic -at  the landed 
price for imported oil. Even in the absence of 
Federal controls, domestic producers cannot 
raise their price above the world (import) 
price regardless of tax-related changes in 
marginal costs and shifts in domestic supply. 
Refiners simply will not pay more for 
domestic oil than the world price, because a 
virtually unlimited supply of imported oil is 
available at the world price. Given the world 
price, the severance tax must be fu Ily 
absorbed by domestic producers-including 
owners of the resource in question -through 
a lower after-tax realized price. The 
regulatory framework for natural gas 
apparently allows for the pass-through of 
severance taxes to final consumers in 
interstate markets, butthe ability of  producers 
to fully avoid those taxes may be limited by 
interfuel substitution, namely competition 
from fuel oil. 
Severance taxes appear to be largely or fully 
passed on to consumers only in the cases of 
coal and uranium. A large proportion of coal 
production is sold to electric power plants 
under long-term fixed supply contracts which 
allow for "pass-through" of increased 
production taxes. Also, the high costs of coal 
transportation tend to segment the national 
market, reducing the competition among 
producing states and making the demand 
schedule relatively inelastic. The highly 
concentrated nature of  the uranium industry, 
together with the lack of substitutes for 
nuclear purposes, also suggests a full 
pass-through of severance taxes. 
These two fuels, however, account for a rela-
tively small share of the total tax revenue 
generated by energy severance taxes. For that 
reason, we may question the claim that these 
taxes generally result in a massive shift of 
income to energy resource-rich states. None-
theless, coal provides the greatest potential 
for such an income transfer, and conse-
quently, large energy-consuming states may 
continue their attempts to limit severance 
taxes on that particu lar fuel. 
Yvonne levy 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Repl estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negoti~ble CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
11,012  7.8 
12,021  10.1 
4,708  13.6 
6,206  12.9 
927  - 3.9 
497  47.9 
786  - 12.1 
219  - 1.4 
4,339  - 10.1 
5,530  - 17.0 
210  0.7 
19,789  30.2 
20,292  35.7 
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